NEW SOUTH WALES COURT ISSUES JUDGEMENT FOR SHUHUI WANG V/S JOHN YUN, ET AL. CASE

Australia, June 20 -- New South Wales Land and Environment Court issued text of the following judgement on May 19:

1. This concerns an application made by the First and Third Defendant for the proceeding to be transferred to the Supreme Court of Victoria pursuant to section 5(2) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1987 (NSW). It is also, and principally, about costs.

2. The proceeding was commenced in this Court by Statement of Claim filed on 31 January 2025. In broad terms, the Plaintiff alleges that the First and Second Defendant are indebted to the Plaintiff in the sum of $1,700,000 together with interest that has been accruing since 13 July 2015. The First and Second Defendant were married as at 13 July 2015 but are now divorced. The Third Defendant is alleged to be the trustee of the family trust of the First Defendant and is sued as guarantor. The First and Third Defendant are commonly represented.

3. The First and Third Defendant filed a Notice of Motion on 24 February 2025, seeking for the proceeding to be transferred. Initially, the Plaintiff consented to the transfer. On 13 March 2025, the solicitors for the First and Third Defendant provided to my Associate a form of consent order that had been signed for the Plaintiff as well as the First and Third Defendant. That order contemplated the transfer of the proceeding to the Supreme Court of Victoria and that the Plaintiff would pay the First and Third Defendant's costs of the application to transfer the proceedings on the ordinary basis.

4. On 13 March 2025, the consent orders were also signed on behalf of the Second Defendant and provided to my Associate. However, later on the same day the Second Defendant proposed that the proceeding be transferred to the Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia in Melbourne, rather than to the Supreme Court of Victoria. The Second Defendant contended that there were related proceedings between the First and Second Defendant in that Court. That change in position by the Second Defendant prompted the Plaintiff to change her position too. The Plaintiff indicated in correspondence that she consented to the Second Defendant's proposal to transfer the proceeding to the FCFCOA, notwithstanding that she had already consented to the proceeding being transferred to the Supreme Court of Victoria. In summary, by the end of 13 March 2025, the Second Defendant and then the Plaintiff resiled from the consent that they had previously given on that day.

5. The proceeding came before me in the Applications List on 14 March 2025. The proceeding was adjourned for a week given the late change in the positions taken by the Second Defendant and Plaintiff, to enable the parties to confer about the issue of the transfer and to give the Second Defendant an opportunity to make an application to transfer of the proceeding to the FCFCOA, if instructed to do so.

6. The Second Defendant filed a Notice of Motion on 19 March 2025, with a supporting affidavit, seeking orders that the proceedings be transferred to the FCFCOA.

7. On 20 March 2025, the Plaintiff's solicitor requested a wide volume of documents from the First and Third Defendant about the proceeding in the FCFCOA.

8. When the matter came back before me on 21 March 2025, Counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that the Plaintiff required further documents and information in order to formulate a position in respect of any transfer of the proceedings. The matter was adjourned once more.

9. On 1 April 2025, the Plaintiff issued a Notice to Produce directed to the First and Third Defendant, seeking material relating to the FCFCOA proceedings. It was expressed in very wide terms. The First and Third Defendant objected to that notice.

10. On 4 April 2025, the Second Defendant gave notice to the parties that she proposed to discontinue her application for the proceeding to be transferred to the FCFCOA. Later that day, the Plaintiff gave notice that she consented to that discontinuance. A document headed "Notice of Discontinuance" dated 2 April 2025 and apparently signed by the solicitor for the Second Defendant was filed in the Court Registry. The notice as filed is plainly bad in form (it was incomplete in a number of respects) and it did not effect any discontinuance of the Second Defendant's Notice of Motion.

11. Over the following days there was some correspondence between the Plaintiff's solicitor and the solicitor for the First and Third Defendant about the Notice to Produce. On 9 April 2025, the Plaintiff's solicitor confirmed that the Plaintiff would not be pressing the notice.

12. On 9 April 2025, the solicitor for the First and Third Defendant circulated proposed orders providing for the transfer of the matter to the Supreme Court of Victoria as well as indemnity costs from the Plaintiff and Second Defendant, to be paid forthwith.

*Rest of the document can be viewed at: (https://www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au/decision/196ec38b96f21e0254c7fe4e)

Disclaimer: Curated by HT Syndication.