Australia, Aug. 13 -- New South Wales Land and Environment Court issued text of the following judgement on July 14:

1. HIS HONOUR: By notice of motion filed on 30 May 2025, the plaintiff, Mr Charbel Elias, seeks judgment against each of the first and second defendants, namely, Ms Lee Smidt and Just Law Group Pty Ltd, in the amount of $230,599.40. Some of that amount has been paid and, in fact, the plaintiff instead moves on that amount less $5,438.11, which is to say, $225,161.29.

2. As raised during the hearing, although this is a case where the default is tolerably clear - no defence has been filed by either defendant, despite orders for that to occur being made on both 22 April 2025 (when it was to be filed on 26 May 2025) and 6 June 2025 (an occasion on which Ms Smidt participated actively by AVL - and when it was ordered to be filed on 20 June 2025) - it is an unusual application for default judgment for the following reasons.

3. First of all, the plaintiff (who is a solicitor) makes serious allegations against the first defendant who, via her company, owns a solicitor's practice operating in Coffs Harbour which is the second defendant, to which more recently the Law Society has appointed a manager. The plaintiff also makes serious allegations against the incorporated law practice itself.

4. Secondly, although the motion seeks judgment in the amount mentioned above, and although it is true that the statement of claim seeks orders that such amount be paid, either by way of "equitable damages/restitution" or statutory damages under the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), in fact the plaintiff is not presently entitled to that amount. He is at present merely exposed to a liability crystallised by a series of Director Penalty Notices issued by the Australian Tax Office to him, and the essential relief which is sought is by way of indemnity against that contingent liability, rather than a compensatory judgment for an amount which as yet he has not paid. That is the position despite Mr Jones, who has appeared on this application which has proceeded ex parte, emphasising quite rightly that it is a large amount and enforceable at any time.

5. Thirdly, there are considerations concerning the regulation of the legal profession and the public confidence in that profession which tell in favour of reasons which are more substantial than would usually be the case in an application of this nature.

6. Fourthly, when the matter was last before the Court, it was set down with an estimate of two days in light of (I infer) the anticipated complexity and significance of the matter.

7. Fifthly, most of the relief sought by the plaintiff is equitable or discretionary. That does not stand in the way of orders in the nature of default judgment, although the applicable principles are slightly different from a case at common law where there is a demonstrated loss: see Termijtelen v Van Arkel [1974] 1 NSWLR 525. However, in order to explain the exercise of discretion involved it is appropriate to say more than merely rely upon the deemed admissions in the verified statement of claim. A recent example of relatively extensive reasons given on an application for default judgment, where equitable relief was sought, may be seen in The University of Notre Dame Australia v Persons Unknown [2025] NSWSC 550 at [37]-[54].

8. That is a long way of saying this. I propose in fairness to the submissions and evidence that have been relied upon by the plaintiff, to give substantially more reasons than would ordinarily be the case in an application for default judgment.

*Rest of the document can be viewed at: (https://www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au/decision/19810c77b5d8dca917be1d3a)

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